



Kenya Wins a Gold Medal for Corruption

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Abstract - *The culture of corruption has grown roots in Kenyan society at large and has become an endemic. Institutions, which were designed for the regulation of the relationships between citizens and the State, are being used instead for the personal enrichment of public officials (politicians and bureaucrats) and other corrupt private agents (individuals, groups, and businesses). Corruption persists in Kenya primarily because there are people in power who benefit from it and the existing governance institutions lack both the will and capacity to stop them from doing so. This work takes a governance and development perspective to analytically examine the causes and consequences of corruption in Kenya. It identifies the key factors (such as absence of strong and effective democratic institutions, centralised power, lack of public accountability, and impunity) and synthesises and analyses available data, indicators, and other information in that regard. The research attributed Causes of Corruption in Kenya to the following: Bad governance political patronage, Lack of political will, Breakdown/erosion/perversion of societal values and norms. Non enforcement of the law, Tribalism, favouritism, nepotism and cronyism, Weak or absence of management systems, Procedures and practices. Misuse of discretionary power vested in individuals or offices, Weak civil society and apathy. Lack of professional integrity, Lack of transparency and accountability, inefficient public sector and Greed. In addition, the police were reported to be corrupt. It was reported that they arrest criminals not to keep law and order but to extort money. A criminal can do anything in Kenya and go scots free as long he has the cash to buy his freedom from the police. The study is a literature review with systematic principles (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2012). This approach is designed to produce a review strategy that adheres to the core concepts of systematic reviews – rigour, transparency, a commitment to taking questions of evidence seriously while allowing for a more flexible and user-friendly handling of retrieval and analysis methods (DFID, 2014; Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2013; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2012).*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Typically, the Olympics make Kenyans giddy. The Games give Kenyans a chance to come together and celebrate something that we can really be proud of. As a Kenyan, I get to bask in the glorious legacy that our runners have built, winning marathon after marathon from London to Boston, and medaling in most of the Olympics in recent memory.

In Rio 2016, Kenya secured 13 medals: six gold, six silver and one bronze, making us the 15th highest-ranking country. But the sweetness of victory was tainted by our national Olympic committee's spectacular mismanagement, which highlighted the growing menace of corruption not just in our sports but in our country at large.

The Kenyan Olympic team's journey to Rio was troubled with issues from the beginning. In May, Kenya was nearly banned from participating in the Games after the World Anti-Doping Agency declared the country noncompliant. (At least 40 of the country's track and field athletes have failed drug tests since the 2012 Olympics in London.) After Kenya missing two deadlines to prove it was tackling the doping problem, Kenya amended its ant doping laws and secured its spot in the Games.

Despite the false start, Kenyan athletes were primed to compete in Rio. Then they encountered more mishaps. The javelins star Julius Yego, who taught himself the sport from YouTube, arrived at the airport and found that he didn't have a ticket. It was only after fellow athletes threatened to not board the plane for the Olympics that the government and airline officials produced a ticket for Mr. Yego. (He went on to win a silver medal.) At least five other athletes made their own travel arrangements after running into the same issue. And the sprinter Carvin Nkanata almost couldn't compete because the Olympic committee had failed to arrange the appropriate documents.

If the incompetence and poor planning weren't bad enough, there was also the misappropriation of funds — a hallmark of Kenyan corruption. Hundreds of hangers-on joined the Olympic delegation, reportedly for little reason beyond a free trip to Brazil. At the opening ceremony, Kenya's team came out in mismatched outfits, raising eyebrows and questions. It turns out that Nike had provided gear for all of Kenya's athletes, but they received only a fraction of it; news reports suggest that the remainder was sold. Nike lodged an official complaint with the deputy president, who was in Rio for the games, and his office has since called for an investigation.

More shocking was the news that two Kenyan Olympic officials were expelled from Rio for doping allegations. Michael Rotich, the manager of the Kenyan athletics team, was accused of soliciting a bribe of more than \$10,000 in exchange for warning athletes about approaching drug tests. And John Anzrah, a track coach, was sent home after impersonating an athlete and providing a urine sample for a doping test.

More worrying than the trouble before and in Rio is what will come next. Many hope the corruption that compromised Kenyans' ability to reach the finish line and win medals will result in some real change. But it's unclear if that will be the case. In Kenya, corruption investigations are common but prosecutions are rare.

Corruption is nothing new in Kenya, but it has reached unprecedented levels recently, with scandals dogging the current administration almost constantly since it took office in 2013. In Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perception Index, Kenya was listed as one of the world's most corrupt countries, ranking 139 out of 168.

Corruption in Kenya is sliding out of control, veteran anti-corruption activist and whistle-blower John Githongo warned in an interview following a scathing audit of government finances. The publication of an official audit found just one percent of Kenya government spending and a quarter of the entire \$16 billion (15 billion euro) budget was not properly accounted for. "This is the most rapacious administration that we have ever had," said Mr Githongo. He also asserted that corruption in Kenya has deepened and widened since President Uhuru Kenyatta came to power in 2013. The comments also came after the former US President Barack Obama's visit to Kenya when he spoke of "the cancer of corruption". Apart from the Auditor-General's report, a series of scandals have emerged in the media concerning government procurement and land grabbing, perhaps the oldest trick in Kenya's corruption playbook. The country is slipping down Transparency International's annual corruption index and is now 145th out of 174 nations, down from 136 in 2013. With media and civil society also under pressure the 50-year-old corruption fighter warned of "the speed with which democratic space is shrinking".

The government insists it is battling graft and Kenyatta has spoken out clearly and often against corruption, including during Obama's visit. In 2016, a handful of ministers and other officials were suspended, but majority of Kenyan's saw this as just "lip service". Kenyans say that there is a complete disconnect between what the president says and what he does. Kenyans accuse Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto of creating "the atmosphere in which civil servants, politicians and businessmen can engage in corruption on the kind of grand destructive scale that is seen in Kenya today. Paying bribes to police and bureaucrats remains routine for ordinary Kenyans. Mr Githongo said the current level of corruption outstrips anything he has seen in a more than 20-year career battling graft." "The details come out in dribs and drabs, but it's clear we've reached a scale of looting that surpasses anything we've had in Kenyan history," Githongo asserts.

In 2002, Mr Githongo was appointed 'anti-corruption czar' by then president Mwai Kibaki, but three years later he fled for his life after uncovering a \$770m (700 million euro) security procurement scam known as Anglo Leasing. Mr Githongo's whistle-blower story became the basis of Michela Wrong's 2009 book *Our Turn to Eat*, a year after Githongo had returned home. The earlier government of Daniel Arap Moi, who ruled for 24 years until 2002, was defined by the \$1 billion (900 million euro) gold subsidy fiddle known as Goldenberg. More recently, Parliament has questioned the tendering behind the new \$13.5 billion (12.4 billion euro) Mombasa-Nairobi railway line, a huge infrastructure project seen as essential to Kenya's economic growth for from the very beginning the project was engineered as a corrupt project reasons being that the Auditor-General had exposed "an environment of unprecedented permissiveness" for corruption. "That only 1.2 per cent of government expenditure can be properly accounted for, is a stinging indictment of the management of public resources. The entire system is either in a state of failure or has been captured by corrupt elites. Githongo dismissed the recent, belated start of prosecutions in the Anglo-Leasing case as "a fig leaf" allowing Kenya to claim to be fighting corruption. Nor was he impressed by the suspension of ministers, depicting the well-worn path of stepping aside, going to court and avoiding prosecution, as "a Laundromat to cleanse their reputations and allow them to go back to public office". "This administration isn't going to have one Goldenberg or one Anglo Leasing, we have got several going on at the same time in different departments," said Mr Githongo.

Kenyans were bemused in March 2016 when former long-serving dictator Daniel Arap Moi decried the scale of graft in the country. During his tenure as president from 1978 until 2002, Moi engineered one of the most sophisticated and ruthless political patronage machines on the continent—patronage that was fed by graft. A 2007 Wiki leaks expose showed that more than \$2 billion of government money was looted under Moi's rule. Since President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy William Ruto took office in 2013, the corruption has widened and deepened.

A report by Kenya's Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission released in August 2016 found that 74 percent of Kenyans believe corruption is rife in their country and that it has increased during the past year of Kenyatta's rule. Corruption invariably crops up in most conversations about the national condition and its effects have started to grind away at some of the country's most vital institutions. Indeed, the president himself declared corruption to be a "national security threat" in his State of the Nation speech in November 2015. However, beyond well-written speeches on the subject, little in the way of inspiring action has been forthcoming. Indeed, a theatrical performance that saw over 20 officials forced to resign has been cynically normalized in a context where many believe the theft of public resources has never been worse. A recent survey by auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) found Kenya to be the world's third-most corrupt country in terms of the prevalence of economic crimes. In part, the conclusion that Kenyatta's is the most corrupt regime in Kenya's history was confirmed by a \$2.7 billion Eurobond commercial loan the country borrowed for recurrent and development expenditure in 2014. Kenya's most credible independent experts can't conclusively tell if this money ever arrived in the country in its entirety and, if it did, it wasn't immediately "eaten," as Kenyans say. The sheer scale of this scandal and others that have filled newspapers for three years staggered citizens.

The regime's reaction to the resultant public questioning and opprobrious in the face of these scandals has only served to further convince Kenyans that the country feels as if it's in the process of being mugged by its leaders. Journalists have been intimidated and even fired, reportedly at the direct insistence of the president. What would the president have to do to recover a modicum of credibility and avoid the taint as one of the continent's most corrupt rulers? For starters, he hails from the richest family in the country with a highly diversified portfolio of investments. As such, the government is his client in a manner so seamlessly incestuous that conflict of interest has been normalized. Secondly, his friends and relations are repeatedly mentioned in some of the most egregious scandals and a wall of impunity appears to protect them. For example, Kenyatta has been accused of failing to act over a scandal in which some 180 million shillings (\$1.8 million) was swindled from the government-run Youth Enterprise and Development Fund (YEDF). Bruce Odhiambo, a close friend of Kenyatta's, was the YEDF's chairman and did not lose his job despite being heavily implicated in the scandal, instead finally voluntarily stepped down in order "to allow investigations to continue." Ridding himself of these relationships would be a first place to start. Transparency regarding familial conflict of interest would be the next.

Since Kenyatta came to office, government procurement and contracting—especially the really large contracts in the rail and security sectors, where the biggest kickbacks usually hide—have been shielded by a veil of impenetrable opacity. The awarding of a 14.9 billion shilling (\$165 million) contract to mobile firm Safaricom to construct a communication and surveillance system, for example, was seen as a done deal awarded without an open bidding process. Hugely inflated consultancy contracts by state corporations and ministries ran by the president's appointees is similarly secretive. What eventually emerges is almost always bad news vis-à-vis the thieving of public funds. The regime has made much of using technology for transparency but it has also been a testament to the fact that you can't digitize integrity. Transparency in this entire area would do much to complicate life for those intent on theft. In the short term, clarity and truth unencumbered by the campaigning of private and service sector interests with a stake in the corruption—specifically, with regard to the Standard Gauge Rail Project linking Nairobi with Mombasa, which has been mired in scandal since it was commissioned with Chinese help in May 2014; Eurobond; and assorted security contracts with foreign entities—would also help.

The harassment of media, civil society and political opposition, whose watchdog role is essential in maintaining even the outward appearance of accountability, simply feeds the narrative of an incorrigibly corrupt and intolerant regime with a host of scandals to hide. All the more so when this harassment coincidentally intensifies whenever a major scandal has been uncovered. It also undermines important democratic developments Kenya has made over the past decade of a deepening democratic recession that seems particularly apparent in the Horn, East and Central Africa. Finally, Kenya goes into a general election in August 2017. Traditionally, major episodes of corruption accompany polls. Unprecedented scandals have taken place already and worse are thus expected. The machinery available to the president to deal with graft—the police, anti-corruption agency, chunks of the judiciary, public prosecutor's office, the State Law Office and the presidency itself—are urgently in need of an overhaul. A start in this direction would help bolster public confidence, but only if preceded by the removal of individuals linked to a president tainted by scandal and the credible prosecution of some of the senior figures behind these scandals. This is a best-case scenario. No one is holding their breath. Kenyatta can borrow a leaf from his neighbor, President John Magafuli of Tanzania, who was recently elected and hit the ground running against corruption. His efforts have captured the imagination of the continent and, ironically, Kenyans most of all.

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Allegations of corruption in the government dominated Kenyan social and political talk in 2016. Here are the top 10 corruption scandals of the year: 1. Eurobond Scandal This complicated multi-billion scandal has dominated talk of corruption in 2016. After 12 months of back and forth between the government and opposition politicians, the truth is yet to be established. 2.

NYS Scandal This scandal started in 2015 but it did not fade in 2016 with even more revelations being made. From a figure of Sh791 Million lost public money, it has now emerged that the money lost is in the billions.³ Rio Scandal the Rio Olympics was a chance for Kenyans to move away from the divisive talk and show the world our amazing athletic talent. Unfortunately, corruption sneaked its way in this auspicious occasion after it emerged that allowances and uniforms meant for athletes had been stolen.⁴ Afya House Scandal This scandal emerged in November after an interim audit report was leaked to the media. According to the audit report, over Sh3 Billion could not be accounted for in the Ministry of Health. The audit report unearthed massive theft of public funds through forgery, double payments, illegal budgetary overspending as well as manipulation of the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS).⁵ SGR Implementation scandal this is another scandal that has persisted for quite a long time. While the project appears to be on track, corruption allegations have continued for the better part of 2016 regarding the quality of the rails, the trains, as well as the cost of the project.⁶ Youth Fund Scandal This scandal adds on to the long list of broken promises made to the youth after it emerged that the board of the Youth Enterprise Fund had misappropriated funds meant for the young people.⁷ Kidder's Sh 20 Billion Scandals This is by far the largest scandal that hit the county governments in Kenya. The Auditor General's report alleged that City Hall could not account for nearly Sh20 Billion of public money.⁸ Kilifi County Scandal the Kilifi County government was the subject of a negative media coverage after it emerged that they could not account for more than Sh2 Billion of public funds.⁹ Murang'a Water Project This is a project that caused political heat after former Prime Minister Raila Odinga alleged that the project would lead to desertification of large parts of the country. The Ministry of Water had to work out a quick deal with local leaders to ensure the project continued.¹⁰ Mombasa County Government's Secret Banks the Mombasa county Government led by Governor Ali Hassan Joho was not spared from the corruption allegations. The Auditor General reported that the county had been operating 22 irregular bank accounts in the collection of revenues. Worthy noting is the fact that Kenya has many bridges that dot the landscape with no roads to lead to them. This is because many projects are started but never get completed due to corruption. The bridge is completed but government often run out of funds to build the road. Corruption has become a common phenomenon in many developing and emerging economies. There are different views on the effects of corruption on entrepreneurship. What is clear is that entrepreneurship is paramount for economic growth. Entrepreneurship development is driven by a number of factors principally social, psychological and economic. All these factors are subject to corruption and consequently can deter entrepreneurship. With the aforementioned, solutions need to be sort hence the justification of this project.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Devolution and corruption in Kenya

The Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi, released the Afro barometer Round 6 survey findings on devolution and corruption in Kenya. The Afro barometer an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. The project is managed by a network comprising Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana; Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy, Benin; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa and IDS, which coordinates the Eastern African and Horn of Africa regions. According to the findings released at the Nairobi Safari Club on 14th April 2015, a majority of Kenyans say corruption has increased over the past year and the government has performed poorly in fighting it. The police, government officials, members of Parliament, and business executives are most widely perceived as corrupt. The huge public expectations raised by devolved government in Kenya have turned into disappointment. Patronage politics that marked the former centralised system has been replicated in the new counties, making government even more inefficient and expensive. Though political leadership is now local, power is closely held, and leaders are suspicious of both national and local rivals. Certain regions, communities and many youth still feel marginalised. Political devolution has deflected but not resolved grievances that fuel militancy, which continues to be met by hard security measures driven from Nairobi. Greater inclusion and cooperation within and between county governments, as well as national-county dialogue, is needed to maximise devolution's potential and ensure militant groups, like Al-Shabaab, have fewer grievances to exploit.

The gulf of mistrust fueled by corruption and exploited by all sides – not only limits the full delivery of devolution's benefits; in the case of counties, it also undermines efforts to combat militancy and attendant violence now subsumed under a "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda that is a priority of both Nairobi and its international partners. Rather than focus solely on building the capacity of the security and intelligence services, international assistance to counter radicalisation should give equal and increasing emphasis to outreach and reconciliation, so as to find political common ground and articulate and address the region's grievances within the country's newly devolved political structures. A renewed civic education campaign to underline the potential gains of devolution, as well as the responsibilities and roles of county government and its elected representatives, is urgently needed. Overall, renewed reconciliation work is needed at all levels in all the counties ahead of elections; specifically, national and county governments and donors need to reach a renewed understanding of the role and limits of civil society and community-based organisations (CSOs and CBOs), which are still best placed to identify and diffuse potential conflict flashpoints at local levels.

The promotion of greater partnership between national and county governments (even as a regional bloc) should be a security and developmental priority for Kenya and its partners but once again this is hampered by corruption. The huge public expectations raised by devolved government have turned into disappointment. Patronage politics that marked the former centralised system has been replicated in the new counties, making government even more inefficient and expensive. Though political leadership is now local, power is closely held, and leaders are suspicious of both national and local rivals. Certain regions, communities and many youth still feel marginalised. Political devolution has deflected but not resolved grievances that fuel militancy, which continues to be met by hard security measures driven from Nairobi. Greater inclusion and cooperation within and between county governments, as well as national-county dialogue, is needed to maximise devolution's potential and ensure militant groups, like Al-Shabaab, have fewer grievances to exploit.

The 2010 constitution prescribes partnership between national and county institutions; instead there is competition and confrontation where central and county governments accuse each other of corruption. The gulf of mistrust – exploited by all sides – not only limits the full delivery of devolution's benefits; in the case of the counties, it also undermines efforts to combat militancy and attendant violence now subsumed under a “countering violent extremism” (CVE) agenda that is a priority of both Nairobi and its international partners. Rather than focus solely on building the capacity of the security and intelligence services, international assistance to counter radicalisation should give equal and increasing emphasis to outreach and reconciliation, so as to find political common ground and articulate and address the grievances within the counties newly devolved political structures.

Kenya Anti-Corruption Legislation

Since 1956, Kenya has had anti-corruption legislation. The first was the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 65), which was, however, repealed in May 2003. In 1993, there were efforts to establish an anti-corruption squad within the CID wing of the police. Unfortunately, the squad was disbanded in 1995 before it could make an impact. The Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 65) was later amended in 1997 to provide for the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), the first Government anti-corruption agency established by law. The first director of KACA, John Harun Mwau, was appointed in 1997. In 2000, the High Court, in *Gachiengo vs Republic*, ruled that KACA undermined the powers of the AG and Commissioner of Police. The High Court held that the statutory provisions establishing KACA were in conflict with the Constitution. As such, KACA was disbanded. In 2003, however, two statutes were enacted to relaunch the fight against corruption: Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Public Officer Ethics Act. Section 70 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act repealed the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The law also established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). Kenya signified its commitment in the fight against corruption by becoming the first country in the world to ratify the UN Convention against Corruption in December 2003 in Merida, Mexico. This was after becoming a signatory to the AU convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2003. Kenya later ratified the AU Convention in 2007. In 2004, a National Anti-corruption Steering Committee was established to complement KACC in the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, this did not solve Kenya's corruption problem. To say the least, these bodies seemed to fuel corruption.

Survey on prevalence of economic crimes

A new survey on prevalence of economic crimes released on Friday, February 26, 2016, ranks Kenya third in corruption in the world. The survey by audit firm Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) found out that only two countries, South Africa and France, have higher corruption rates than Kenya, a new low for the country following a series of corruption scandals that have rocked the Jubilee administration and organisations in the country. South Africa is number one with 69% while France is second with 68%. Kenya comes third with 62% of economic crimes. According to the survey, Kenya ranks top of the world in areas such as embezzlement, bribery and procurement fraud. It ranks embezzlement as the most dominant economic crime in the country. The survey further reveals that only 1% of Kenya's national budget for the previous financial year had been properly accounted for. The rest has either been embezzled or stolen through bribery and corruption. Half of the respondents in the survey who hail from Kenya revealed that they have either experienced or given out a bribe, a prevalence rate that is double the global average.

Kenya took position three in global ranking after rates of economic crimes in the country shot up with a 17% increase. South Africa is just 7% ahead of Kenya. 61% of the respondents from 99 organisations spanning different economic sectors said they had suffered some form of economic crimes in the last 24 months, a 9% increase from 2014's 52%. Four African countries were surveyed and they all featured in the top 10 in the world. Others are Zambia which ties with Kenya and Nigeria which falls in the top 10 category. On law enforcement agencies, most Kenyans surveyed said they do not have any faith in them. Perhaps this is because of the latest incident (2016) where Supreme Court Judge Philip Tunoi allegedly received a KSh200 million bribe from Nairobi Governor Evans Kidero to help him win a petition by Kabete MP Ferdinand Waititu challenging his election as governor.

Corruption among top officials in the government

Corruption among security officers is also believed to be the reason why Kenyans have no faith in law enforcement agencies. 72% of respondents do not believe in law enforcement agencies. The latest comes amid a flurry of scandals involving top officials in the government. The latest is the NYS scandal (2016) that has continued to unfold as days go by. When everybody thought things had settled down, Josephine Kabura, a prime suspect in the ongoing cases, tabled an explosive affidavit detailing how former Devolution Cabinet Secretary Anne Waiguru allegedly masterminded the looting of KSh791 million NYS money. As Kenyans pondered on the explosive affidavit, Waiguru tabled her own affidavit, a more explosive one linking top government officials to the scandal. Among those named in her affidavit are Majority Leader in the National Assembly Aden Duale, Senator Kipchumba Murkomen and Treasury Cabinet Secretary Henry Rotich. There is also personal assistant to Deputy President William Ruto, Farouk Kibet, and a man named as Ruto's brother, Luke Samoei Ruto.

Then there is the Eurobond scandal which opposition leader Raila Odinga alleges happened. The government cannot reveal the projects the money from Eurobond proceeds used to fund. This is why Raila believes the money was misappropriated. There is also the chicken gate scandal. Here, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) officials are accused of receiving bribes for the supplying of election materials in the 2013 general election. And the list continues. Overall, the evidence on the conditions under which different types of anti-corruption interventions help effectively reduce corrupt practices (or fail to do so) is mixed, and causal effects are hard to prove. The evidence on contextual factors influencing the effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms is still sparse, although its importance is increasingly being recognised, in particular for social accountability mechanisms. The difficulty of separating contextual factors from reforms, and the complexity of identifying the direction of causality, remains a challenge to clearly identifying contextual factors and their effects on reforms. Nevertheless, while the review does identify the "usual suspects" of political will and local ownership, a range of other explanatory and contextual factors for the success of anti-corruption interventions does emerge.

Millions of Kenyan budget lost to corruption.

Kenya is losing a third of its state budget - the equivalent of about \$6 billion - to corruption every year, in 2016, the country's new anti-graft chief told Reuters, saying his agency was badly short of staff and modern equipment to tackle the problem. Philip Kinisu, a retired auditor, said in an interview that he wanted to build on Kenyans' discontent with corruption but the real drive to stamp it out had to come from public pressure for change. While the finance minister disputed Kinisu's estimate of the losses, blaming instead poor paperwork, President Uhuru Kenyatta has acknowledged corruption has reached levels that threaten national security.

Kenya has a history of multi-million dollar scandals that have failed to result in high-profile convictions. This has angered the public, who accuse top officials of acting with impunity and encouraging graft by those in lower posts. It is a known fact that in Kenya corruption starts with the presidency, to the judiciary, to the legislative. In a nutshell, all arms of the government are rotten. Kenyans are where they are today because they elected thieves.

Regional performance

Kenya had the same score as Uganda but performed worse than its neighbours Rwanda and Tanzania who scored 54 and 30 points respectively. Burundi came last in the region with a score of 21 points. The best performing countries in the world remain the Nordic countries led by Denmark with an index of 91. Finland came second at 90 points, followed by Sweden and New Zealand with 89 and 88 points respectively. The reports listed war-torn Somalia and the reclusive North Korea the worst performers, each with 8 points, and appearing at the bottom of the rankings.

Although President Uhuru Kenyatta has continually declared a "zero tolerance" war on graft, going as far as firing cabinet secretaries named in corruption allegations, there has been little in the way of convictions of corrupt individuals. Indeed, despite a flurry of investigations and arrests of high profile individuals named in corruption allegations, the last time such individuals were convicted and jailed was in 2012 when the former Kenya Tourism Board managing director Achieng' Ong'onga and former Tourism Principal Secretary Rebecca Nabutola were sent to prison for up to four years each for defrauding the ministry. Even then, they served for a little more than two months before they were freed on bail pending the hearing of their cases at the Court of Appeal. In a nutshell, Kenya is corrupt through and through.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The study is a literature review with systematic principles (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2012). This approach is designed to produce a review strategy that adheres to the core concepts of systematic reviews – rigour, transparency, a commitment to taking questions of evidence seriously while allowing for a more flexible and user-friendly handling of retrieval and analysis methods (DFID, 2014; Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2013; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2012). The study developed specific research sub-questions for each of the three questions outlined on the basis of a Conceptual Framework elaborated at the inception of the study.

Following guidance outlined by Hagen-Zanker and Mallett 2013 on how to carry out a review of the evidence using systematic principles, the approach to identify relevant sources consisted of three separate tracks: a literature search; snowballing, which involved seeking advice on relevant from key experts; and capturing the grey literature, which involved hand-searching a variety of pre-selected institutional websites.

Following all three tracks enabled the researcher to produce a focused review that captured material from a broad range of sources. In terms of Track 1 (literature search), given the breadth of the questions and the literature and resources available, it was not possible to address all three overarching questions through a systematic review. Instead, the study looked specific sub-questions using systematic principles, while relying on a “synthesis of syntheses” for questions where the findings are better known/more established.

The study addressed all three questions using a consistent and rigorous approach to the collection and analysis of evidence. A Research Protocol was developed for this study, which details the methodological steps for each of these tracks, including the different search strings that were identified and tested. Given the breadth of the questions and the literature and resources available, the study adopted varied approaches to the review, as follows:

Q1: Review of the literature using a non-systematic approach;

Q2: Systematic search on financial costs, non-systematic approach on political/ developmental effects/impact;

Q3: Systematic search on selected interventions, non-systematic search on other interventions.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The paper sought to answer the following research questions;

- *What are the causes of corruption in Kenya?*
- *What is the level of corruption in Kenya compared to the rest of the world?*
- *What are the effects of corruption?*
- *What are the benefits of fighting corruption?*

C. FINDINGS

Although most citizens believe they can make a difference in fighting corruption by refusing to pay bribes and by reporting bribery, a majority of those who said they paid bribes did not report the incidents. The main reasons for non-reporting are fear of consequences and perceived inaction by authorities.

Among the findings, two-thirds (64%) of Kenyans say that the level of corruption in the country has increased somewhat or a lot in the past year. Three-fourths (75%) of respondents say "most" or "all" of the police are corrupt, followed by government officials (46%) and members of Parliament (45%).

Among non-state actors, business executives are viewed as the most corrupt (38%). While seven out of 10 Kenyans (70%) perceive the government as having handled the fight against corruption "fairly badly" or "very badly", a majority (69%) believe that the same government is better able to fight corruption than the opposition.

More than half (58%) of Kenyans say that ordinary citizens can make a difference in the fight against corruption while 76 % believe in the effectiveness of the media in revealing government mistakes and corruption. Most respondents blamed Kenya's continued dismal performance on the incompetence and ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies, saying that the failure to punish individuals implicated in graft has been a major stumbling block.

Respondents asserted that the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Department of Public Prosecution and the Judiciary all bear collective responsibility for high corruption levels in the country. These three departments are responsible for investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating corruption cases and they have failed to deliver. One respondent asserted that he investigated fraud in Kenyan post bank and discovered that bank officers were stealing western union transactions. When he reported the crime his bosses colluded to frame him with the very crimes he had exposed. The fraudsters were within.

It was also found out that the failure to recover assets acquired through dishonest means has also contributed to an unabashed culture of corruption in the country. The respondents also attributed Kenya's poor ranking on a shrinking media space, lack of public access to information and a Judiciary that is not independent. The research found the Effects of Corruption in Kenya to be the following: Poor infrastructure e.g. impassable roads, poor telephone network, Increased cost of goods and services, Increased poverty, Shoddy work and stalled projects, Poor medical services (e.g. lack of medicine and doctors), Reduced investments in our economy, Unemployment, Rise in crime rate and insecurity, Delay denial and sale of justice in our public land, property and utilities, Social unrest and Negative international image. No wonder the World Bank says that Kenya is growing faster than any other sub-saharran country but it corruption is a major impediment to the country's growth. In a nutshell, the paper suggests that corruption in the Kenyan government is largely an institutional problem rather than a cultural one.

D. BENEFITS OF FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN KENYA

The following were found to be the benefits of fighting corruption in Kenya: Our economy will grow and Increase public revenue, Create more jobs, Fund our social services, Improve our infrastructure, Provide better health care, Alleviate poverty, Improve our living standards, Make us stand proud among nations, We will have a caring society, Our resources will be used to develop the country, The crime rate will decline and we shall have improved security, We shall produce quality products at affordable prices, There will be increased investor confidence in our country, There will be peace and stability in our country, Mismanagement of public funds in the counties has also been periodically mentioned in reports by financial oversight organs like the auditor-general, the Controller of Budget and the Commission on Revenue Commission, According to reports from these organs, improper procurement procedures have contributed to corruption. The 'get-rich-now' attitude prevalent among some officials in the counties has also contributed to misuse of public funds through unnecessary domestic and foreign trips and inflated numbers of MCA sittings to get additional allowances, If devolution was meant to empower local communities through employment opportunities, access to county tenders and participation in local governance issues, then it has failed to tangibly achieve these noble objectives in these three years, In addition to corruption, county governments have been embedded to the culture of tribalism, clanism, nepotism and cronyism. It has been about who knows you and how to access county employment and tendering opportunities. Anyway, the bottom line is that we are a corrupt country...very corrupt indeed. This has been confirmed by the CEO of Kenya in his address to Kenyans in Israel recently. This is a tragedy and it seems that citizenry thinks they are powerless. The paper found that Kenyans have the power to stop this grand theft by voting the right people into power. Not from our tribes but from anywhere as long as they are women and men of integrity. Respondents asserted that Tanzania seems to have gotten it right if President Magufuli maintains the tempo. The paper also found that Kenyans have eventually learnt that thieves have no other tribe...their language and tribe is stealing. The idea that there can be our thief is really crazy and needs to be killed once and for. Respondents thus asserted that they should vote in leaders of integrity regardless of their tribes. It was also found out foreign investors in Kenya cited corruption is as one of the major reasons why such companies may consider relocating their investments from Kenya. It is a serious economic killer. Yes a few guys will be very wealthy but the majority will continue to get poorer. We need to get angry enough and do what we must do to redeem our country from this monster that is devouring us quickly and surely. Yes we can do it if we are ready for it.

IV. THE PAPER IN A NUTSHELL

This study has sought to address the following overarching question: "What are the conditions that facilitate corruption, what are its costs and what the most effective ways to combat it are?" The key headline messages that emerge from the analytical review include the following: Corruption is symptom of governance dynamics and institutional quality. It is also a collective, rather than purely individualized, challenge. It involves a variety of interactions, dynamics and linkages between multiple actors, organizations and in situations at different levels. It is this collective and systemic character of corruption that makes it so entrenched and so difficult to address. Democracy does not in and of itself solve corruption. Women in politics are not a magic bullet against corruption. Economic costs of corruption are hard to quantify. The effect of corruption on economic growth remains open to question. Overall, corruption can have a negative effect on economic growth over the short term, although the estimated size of the effect varies significantly. But the literature focused on more foundational aspects of growth finds that corruption has not been a (or the) determining factor constraining growth. Social spending and investments suffer from corruption, Corruption affects the poor disproportionately and gives rise to inequality, and Corruption is both a cause and an effect of a lack of trust in the state. The relationship between corruption and fragility remains unsettled: it can be a source of conflict but has also been an important stabilizing factor in some settings. The environment suffers from corruption. Anti-corruption measures are most effective when they are supported by other contextual factors and are integrated into a broader package of institutional reforms. Gendered approaches also need to be further mainstreamed. Multilateral anti-corruption initiatives are under-researched and thus so far have not paid sufficient attention to context.

The research attributed Causes of Corruption in Kenya to the following: Bad governance Political patronage, Lack of political will, Breakdown/erosion/perversion of societal values and norms. Non enforcement of the law, Tribalism, favoritism, nepotism and cronyism, Weak or absence of management systems, Procedures and practices. Misuse of discretionary power vested in individuals or offices, Weak civil society and apathy. Lack of professional integrity, Lack of transparency and accountability, inefficient public sector and Greed. In addition, the police were reported to be corrupt. It was reported that they arrest criminals not to keep law and order but to exsord money. A criminal can do anything in Kenya and go scorts free as long he has the cash to buy his freedom from the police.

Overall, the evidence on the conditions under which different types of anti-corruption interventions help effectively reduce corrupt practices (or fail to do so) is mixed, and causal effects are hard to prove. The evidence on contextual factors influencing the effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms is still sparse, although its importance is increasingly being recognized, in particular for social accountability mechanisms. The difficulty of separating contextual factors from reforms, and the complexity of identifying the direction of causality, remains a challenge to clearly identifying contextual factors and their effects on reforms.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Fighting corruptions in Kenya starts with citizens and they should do the following to fight corruption: Respect and protect public property, Avoid engaging in corruption, Never give or receive a bribe, Appreciate and reward hard work, honesty and trustworthiness, Report cases of corrupt practices to the commission, Talk to everyone about the evils of corruption, Refuse to be pressurized to act irregularly and unlawfully, Never falsify a claim, Be a role model, Develop interest in national issues, Stigmatize ill gotten wealth, Teach children the virtues of honesty hard work integrity and self discipline, Correct and reprimand bad behavior, Give advice direction and suggestions on how to fight corruption to management at ones place of work, Name and shame corrupt people.

A. EVIDENCE GAPS IN THE LITERATURE ON CORRUPTION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As the Introduction discussed, this Paper is not intended to produce new knowledge, but rather to provide an authoritative assessment of the existing literature on corruption. On the other hand, in the process of reviewing the available evidence on corruption, the analysis in this study has identified a few gaps and potential areas for further research. These include the following:

Policy research that is disaggregated by type of corruption. Most studies currently do not distinguish between different types of corruption when discussing the causes of corruption, the effects/impact of corruption and what this implies for how to address corruption more effectively. This kind of disaggregation seems relevant as it can generate important knowledge/insights to inform policy-making and thereby offer concrete propositions about how anti-corruption reforms and programming need to change as a result of these insights.

Wider collection and analysis of data that are also disaggregated by gender. For example, more gendered evidence on acts of corruption committed by public officials, as well as on citizens' experiences with corruption, can be useful for future research on the relationship between gender and corruption. More rigorous and in-depth analysis of anti-corruption interventions that to date seem to be most effective. As depicted in the paper, research findings suggest that some anti-corruption interventions are more effective than others. However, the size of the evidence remains relatively small. It would therefore seem relevant and important to delve more deeply into the interventions suggested so as to test and/or validate their effectiveness more robustly.

More high-quality comparative quantitative studies on the effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms/interventions to better understand the impact of context should be done. This would be particularly beneficial for the interventions suggested. Understanding of the interdependency of different types of anti-corruption interventions. For instance, do interventions adequately capture/target the dynamic nature of corruption? And is the success of particular types of reforms/interventions dependent on others already in place? This kind of research would help shed some light on the question about the relevance and appropriateness of different actions against corruption at different times in a country's development, and whether and how anti-corruption interventions should be sequenced. Evidence on this could be especially relevant in countries emerging from conflict, where the political settlement is still fluid and a careful balance between different needs and reform objectives needs to be achieved.

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